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AN INSIGHT INTO THE FIRM CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND  
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In their seminal work Modigliani and Miller (1958) initiated the theory of capital structure.  Their 
original insights and continued efforts (Modigliani and Miller, 1963 and 1965) laid the foundations of 
modern corporate finance.  The consequent years have been rich of further theoretical and empirical 
developments in the understanding of the firm capital structure.  DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
analyze the effects of taxes on capital structure.  Myers (1977) investigates the optimal levels of debt 
while Warner (1977) explores the relationship between bankruptcy costs and capital structure.  Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) analyze how managers behave under varying levels of debt and equity.   
However, as Harris and Raviv (1991) review article demonstrates, the motives and 
circumstances that could determine the choice of capital structure seem nearly uncountable.  Despite 
the numerous answers offered the “capital structure puzzle” still remains and there are new questions 
arising all the time with the changes in economic reality.  One such issue calling for investigation is 
the capital structure of firms in transition economies.  A fundamental transformation of firm 
borrowing strategies is a central component of the transition from communism to market.  Therefore, 
how the theory can be translated into practical financial management strategies enhancing value 
creation is in the focus of this analysis.  Because the aim is to address the audience of managers and 
practitioners in the field, a simplified approach based on stylized theoretical and empirical facts is 
applied.   
The paper defines capital structure, in section 2, and examines, in a simplified practical way, 
in section 3, its influence on the cost of capital and the value of a company.  Further, in section 4, the 
paper sketches practical implications concerning the choices and management of capital structure.  In 
section 5, particular attention is paid to relevant issues and relationships in economies in transition.  A 
conceptual and practical understanding of these relationships will support the professional manager in 
his/her efforts to garner added value for shareholders and society in the dynamic and risky transition 
environment.  Section 6 provides summary and conclusion.  
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2. FIRM CAPITAL STRUCTURE: A STYLIZED VIEW 
How effectively a company purchases and uses raw materials and employs labor affects economic 
profits.  Improvements in the production process that lower the costs of goods increase profits and 
value. These and other actions on the “operating side of the firm” add increments of value to the firm.  
Capital is a raw material for the firm as well.  A company takes financial capital and converts it into 
assets. It operates those assets to earn economic returns by fulfilling customer needs. The liability and 
equity side of a company balance sheet records the origins of a company’s capital.  
Capital structure theory focuses on how firms finance assets.  The capital structure decision 
centers on the allocation between debt and equity in financing the company.  An efficient mixture of 
capital reduces the price of capital.  Lowering the cost of capital increases net economic returns, 
which, ultimately, increases firm value.  
An “unlevered firm” uses only equity capital.  A “levered firm” uses a mix of equity and 
various forms of liabilities.  Aside from deciding on a target capital structure, a firm must manage it in 
a dynamic perspective.  Imperfections in capital markets, taxes, and other practical factors influence 
the managing decisions.  Imperfections may suggest a capital structure less than the theoretical 
optimum.  Operation of assets and the firm’s financing of those assets jointly dictate firm value.   
Debt or liabilities represent the value of the creditors’ stake in the firm.  The value of debt 
represents the discounting and summing of all current and future payments the company has promised 
to creditors.  These liabilities take various forms and have different claim positions with regard to the 
cash flows and assets of the company.  At this stage it is important to recognize that creditors have 
claims against the company and these claims always are ahead of the stockholders interests.  
Equity represents the value of the shareholder interests.  Stockholders always have last claim 
on the results of economic activities.  Stockholders are residual claimants.  Equity value represents the 
discounted summation of all current and future residual cash flows of the company.  
Total capital equals the amount of financing from all sources.  Total capital on an economic 
balance sheet is the sum of equity capital and debt capital of all forms.  This total equals the sum of all 
assets on the balance sheet as well.  
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Capital structure represents the proportions of capital from different sources.  In a simplified 
context, it is the proportion of financing from debt and from equity capital.  Common ratios such as 
debt-to-total capital or debt-to-equity quantify this relationship.  Furthermore, understanding capital 
structure calls for an examination of certain aspects of risk, return, and value.  Business, financial, and 
total risk is related to the level of economic income.  
Business risk reflects all sources of risk that affect revenues, costs, and asset operation.  Some 
of the factors affecting business risk are: (i) changes in the relative efficiency of manufacturing 
process; (ii) relative effectiveness of advertising; (iii) changes in interest rates that influence product 
demand; (iv) government actions that create uncertainty in a company’s operation.  
Financial risk results from commitments to use expected cash flows to service creditors and 
taxing authorities.  Creditors stand in line ahead of stockholders.  This form of risk arises from 
promises and requirements resulting from the use of debt and the tax environment.  Examples of 
financial risk include uncertainty about interest rates and a change in the interest payments if the 
company has variable rate of debt or if it plans to raise debt in the future.  The risk that taxing 
authorities will change tax rates also adds to financial risk.  
The aggregate effects of all factors that influence business and financial risk ultimately 
determine the total risk borne by the stockholders.  Risk affects the expected level and uncertainty of 
the economic net operating income (NOI).  The NOI is the normal source of cash flow for the payment 
of interest and principal on debt.1  The level and uncertainty in NOI affects the amount the company 
can borrow and the terms of borrowing.  In general, the greater the level of NOI, the greater the 
borrowing capacity; the lower the risk in NOI, the greater the borrowing capacity.  For a given level of 
NOI and a given amount of borrowing, the lower the risk of NOI, the lower the cost of borrowing.  
 
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Assumptions and definitions 
A rigorous academic examination of capital structure theory involves many assumptions.  With the 
ultimate goal a practical simplified application, we take liberty and limit assumptions to: (i) interest is 
a tax-deductible expense; (ii) bankruptcy has costs; (iii) mistakes in financing a company may affect 
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its operations;2 (iv) the company seeks to create value in a risky environment. (v) the environment is 
dynamic.  For example, interest rates, the economic environment, and other factors that influence 
value may change.  The last two assumptions are particularly relevant for the economies in transition. 
Investors assign value to risky assets.  We assume they favor: (i) less rather than more risk, 
return held constant; (ii) more return rather than less return, risk held constant; (iii) return now rather 
than later in time, return held constant.  Finally, if the company does what investors like (dislike), the 
stock price increases (decreases), other factors constant.  
Furthermore, a few definitions are given explicitly to help in the following discussion.  Thus, 
debt capacity is the amount of money a company currently could borrow.  It is not, however, the 
amount it should borrow.  Unused debt capacity is capacity to borrow more.  Good debt is debt that 
adds increments of value to share price.  Unused good debt capacity is incremental borrowing that 
would add to share value.  Unused debt capacity exceeds unused good debt capacity, because a 
company can borrow more than it should in terms of shareholders’ interests.  
Finally, throughout the discussion we assume a fixed amount of financing because our focus is 
on the debt-equity choice that firms make and not on the amount of financing they require.  In the next 
sections we examine the effect of using different proportions of debt and equity in financing a 
company.   
 
Stylized model 
Understanding why the correct proportion of debt in the capital structure lowers the cost of capital and 
increases stock price is in the focus of this analysis.  There are many elegant and detailed approaches 
as proofs of the theory.  Our explanation is simplified and rests on the astuteness of rational economic 
agents, which in fact, provides ultimately foundation to all theories.3  
Creditors have very carefully organized and specified claims against a company’s cash flows 
during normal operations as well as during bankruptcy.  Equity holders are always last in line, behind 
all creditors.  The position of each claimant in the line affects the riskiness of his/her cash flows.  
Those first in-line claim the most certain cash flows - and their removal of the most certain cash flows 
increases the risk of the cash flows that remain for those behind them.  Creditors and equity holders 
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are rational.  Claimants further back in-line demand higher returns to compensate themselves for the 
additional risk that they bear.  Thus, shareholders require higher returns for the added financial risk of 
creditors.  
However, shareholders know another very important fact about debt; they can make money 
from its use.  In fact, the focal point of capital structure theory hinges on shareholders recognizing that 
debt use can add to their returns.  Shortly, we will see that on an after-tax basis, the use of the 
appropriate amount of debt adds value if the company enjoys a tax deduction for interest payments.  
The relationship between the weighted cost of capital (WCOC) and thus price of stock (POS) 
for a company, on the one hand, and the proportion of debt the company uses in its capital structure 
(D/(D+E)), on the other hand, is of special interest here.  This is a relationship that results from a 
change in the financing of the company.  We assume the company has the same amount of total 
financing (e.g. 100 units).  The relationship is depicted in figure 1. 
- Figure 1 here - 
At the one extreme (the left hand side of the WCOC curve), total capital is 100 units and all 
from equity.  As we move to the (right) other extreme, total capital is still the same (100 units) but 
debt increases and with it financial risk increases as well.  Total risk increases also since financial risk 
is increasing.  Equity decreases as the number of shares of stock decreases.  The company does not 
need as much equity financing because debt is replacing equity in the capital structure.  Expected 
earnings per share (EPS) increase since fewer shares exist and the expected tax benefits of using debt 
contribute to the EPS.  From this discussion it is clear that companies can fall into one of two cases. 
Case 1: Unlevered firm (no debt)  
Claimants are not in line.  Only shareholders as a group have a claim on expected net operating 
income, NOI, and they bear the risk associated with this income.  Total risk consists of business risk 
and the risk associated with the tax environment.  The relationship between the expected level of 
earnings per share, EPS and an arbitrarily assumed price-earnings ratio (P/E ratio) for the EPS is of 
interest here.  The P/E ratio changes as the risk of EPS changes.  When moving to positive debt levels, 
the risk of EPS increases due to the added use of debt and resultant increase in financial risk and 
increased risk of NOI.  
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Case 2: Levering the firm  
Adding debt places additional creditors ahead of stockholders.  Creditors have the right to take the 
most certain part of pre-tax earnings for interest.  Creditors are entitled to the most certain after-tax 
earnings for the repayment of principle as well.  If creditors take the best returns generated by the 
operations of the company, the quality of the remaining proceeds must be lower.  The risk of the 
economic net income must be higher.  Adding creditors ahead of shareholders adds financial risk and 
thus increases the total risk of NOI.  This affects negatively how shareholders value a unit of expected 
earnings, and results in decreasing P/E ratio.4  The greater the claims of creditors, the greater the risk 
for shareholders of each unit of net income.   
To understand the relation between share price and debt, we focus further on the after tax cost 
of debt and the expected economic earnings per share, EPS.  The ability to deduct interest charges for 
tax purposes affects the after-tax cost of debt.  Assume, for example, the company borrows money at a 
12 per cent annual rate and writes a cheque to the creditor actually paying the 12 per cent rate of 
interest.  Tax time arrives.  If the tax rate is 40 per cent and the company deducts the 12 per cent 
interest paid, the after-tax cost to the company is 7.2 per cent.5  The deductibility of interest and the 
government essentially paying for part of the interest by allowing its deduction from pre-tax income 
does not change the cash flows to creditors.  Creditors still get the 12 per cent.  Consequently, the 
benefits of the tax deductibility must flow to the company and, ultimately, to the stockholders.  
Thus, with the increase of debt, the expected earnings per share increase for two reasons.  
First, since debt replaced some equity, the number of shares outstanding is less.  Second, the tax 
benefits of the deductibility of debt contribute to the expected earnings per share - so long as the 
contribution to earnings from the use of debt exceeds interest charges on debt.  The price of the stock 
(POS) is the product of the expected earnings per share, EPS and the price-earnings ratio, P/E: POS = 
EPS.P/E.  
The market price of the stock continues to increase with the increased use of debt so long as 
the expected increase in EPS is sufficient to overpower the effects of the decline in the P/E ratio.  
However, the P/E ratio declines at an increasing rate with the increase in the use of debt.  This 
behavior has its origin in investors’ concerns about a host of factors associated with the use of “too 
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much debt”.  These concerns relate to the fact that pre-tax income may not be sufficient to allow the 
deduction of interest.  If so, the tax advantages of debt no longer exist.  In fact, if the company has a 
loss, the loss on a per share basis grows at a faster rate if the company is using debt.  This happens for 
two reasons.  First, the company is not earning enough on its assets to pay creditors; the shareholders 
must make up the difference.  The shareholders effectively pay the full cost of borrowing money 
absent an effective tax deduction.  Second, there is a possibility of creditors disrupting operations or, 
in the worse case, creditors initiating bankruptcy proceedings.  
From the shareholder’s point of view, the optimal capital structure results in the maximum 
share price.  Increasing the proportion of capital from debt increases share price until reaching the 
optimal capital structure.  Additional debt beyond this point causes share price to decline.  Stock price 
begins to decline when the value in today’s money or present value of expected tax advantages of 
incremental debt no longer are attractive enough to compensate investors for the additional financial 
risk associated with the incremental debt.  
 
4. DISCUSSION AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
In a tax environment allowing the deduction of interest, capital structure does affect the value of a firm 
and its stock price.  An optimal way to finance the firm thus exists.  Capital structure theory is of value 
even if the array of assumptions in that theory does not hold.  An environment characterized by 
changes in economic variables, e.g. changes in interest rates, price of bearing risk, institutional change, 
recessions, etc. does influence the choice and management of capital structure.  Therefore, reasonable 
practical approaches to the management of capital structure are needed.  
 
The “optimal capital structure” 
No equation exists to determine the optimal capital structure for a company but clues and judgment 
guide the decision.  Several clues that emanate from the market offer guidance on the approximate 
optimal debt ratio.  Practical guidelines or “rules of thumb” on the optimal debt ratio might include 
one or more of the following: (i) increases in debt levels that result in a disproportional large jump in 
the cost of debt signal movement past the optimal debt point; (ii) comments by analysts offer 
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guidance; concerns about the company’s ability to service its debt clearly signal the company already 
has exceeded the optimal ratio; (iii) the reaction of the market to the capital structure of other 
companies with similar business risk; (iv) the eagerness of underwriters to handle a new issue of 
incremental debt on an underwritten basis.   
As market participants, the shareholders value flexibility in financing possibilities.  The 
flexibility argument recognizes that the option to quickly obtain additional financing through unused 
good debt capacity is of significant value to shareholders.  The degree of flexibility is a function of 
several variables including the business risk of the company, the cyclical nature of its business, the 
likely opportunity set facing the company, and characteristics of the company’s existing financing.  
A company benefits by having access to a reasonable amount of incremental debt regardless 
of economic and capital market conditions.  Unused good debt capacity provides the opportunity to 
obtain capital short order.  This may allow the company to take advantage of unusual opportunities or 
avoid being forced to take actions it deems undesirable.  Once shareholders share this view, keeping 
unused good debt capacity in reserve adds to share price.  
 
Managing the capital structure 
In our discussion of the management of capital structure a review of the relationship between the 
WCOC and the (D/(D+E)) ratio is useful (see figure 1).  The curve representing this relationship 
declines and is relatively flat as it approaches the minimum point, and increases relatively quickly 
once past the minimum or optimal point.  We use the term “flat” to denote that the curve does not 
steeply slope at and to the left of the optimal point, which means changes in capital structure, in this 
range, do not have a large impact on WCOC.  
The optimal company’s strategy calls for normally maintaining its capital structure in the flat 
portion of the curve.  The additional debt associated with moving towards the minimum point on the 
WCOC curve represents unused good debt capacity.  The company keeps this in reserve for 
unanticipated needs.  Possible strategies of the company are:  
(a) moves to the right towards the minimum point such that it increases the use of debt and 
utilizes some of its debt capacity;  
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(b) moves to the left such that it decreases the use of debt and restores debt capacity;  
(c) generates and retains earnings within the company such that it moves to the left since 
earnings represent equity, increasing the denominator in the D/(D+E) ratio;  
(d) issues debt and uses the proceeds to buy back some stock such that it moves to the right.  
Issuing debt and buying equity affects both the numerator and denominator in the D/(D+E) ratio.  This 
results in: (i) an increase in cost of equity due to increased financial risk; (ii) a lower weighted cost of 
capital as the company moved to the right towards the WCOC curve minimum point; (iii) an increase 
in share price, which stems from an interaction of fewer shares outstanding, greater expected earnings 
per share, and a decrease in the price-earnings ratio due to the increased risk of a unit of earnings.  
Further, the investment in good projects results in the generation of economic profits.  The 
retention of economic profit rather than payment of the full amount in dividends represents additions 
to equity.  These additions to equity increase equity in the denominator of the D/(D+E) ratio.  With the 
passage of time the generation and retention of profits increases the equity base and results in 
company moving back to the left on the WCOC curve.  If with time the company also is paying down 
the principle on its debt, this reduces the numerator in the D/(D+E) ratio and further accelerates the 
movement to the left on the WCOC curve.  Since the WCOC curve is flat as one approaches the 
optimal ratio, moving back to the left has little effect on the WCOC.  If one accepts the flexibility 
argument and its potential value, financing in the flat portion of the curve would not adversely affect 
the WCOC.  
With time, the firm restores its borrowing base for “good debt”.  At a future time, it issues 
another chunk of debt.  This moves the firm to the right, again towards the minimum point on the 
WCOC curve.  The firm can use this debt to finance incremental investments.  Since its equity base 
has grown, it is in effect financing part of these investments with equity -- the financing of incremental 
projects with this combination of debt and equity approximates the proportions of the long-term 
capital structure of the firm.  New, good projects, will contribute to the equity base.  If the firm has 
excess funds and wants to move towards the optimal capital structure, it can repurchase some of its 
own stock with attendant increase in share value.  
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5. CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES  
Specificities 
Before reforms firms had soft budget constraints that resulted largely from interdependence between 
the state and enterprises.  While there were some constraints on firm spending, these constraints were 
not wholly binding because the state could readily reallocate funds to cover additional expenditures.  
The state used its network of administrative bureaus to control resource flows throughout the economy 
and to redistribute resources from profitable firms to those that were not performing well.  This 
virtually guaranteed firm survival, but it also created resource shortages and intense pressure for firms 
to increase production (Kornai, 1986).   
While the firm depended on the state for all inputs, the state also depended on firms to provide 
scarce resources to other enterprises and to provide employees with jobs, housing, medical care, and 
other social services.  State bureaus closely monitored many of the firm’s activities, and managers 
responded by hoarding resources and bargaining for favorable treatment.  Bargaining for scarce capital 
was acute and financing was highly uncertain because funding varied with state political whims and 
the personal allegiances of high-ranking officials.   
Since early stage of reforms, firms began to seek non-state sources of funding both because 
the state was reducing its financial support of the firms and because borrowing from non-state sources 
was becoming more attractive than state funds.  In even the largest firms, the state began to transform 
its role from sole owner to that of a shareholder with limited responsibility and limited liability.  While 
the state did not stop direct transfers completely, managers were increasingly aware that financing the 
firm was their responsibility.  At the same time, financial autonomy was attractive to manager and 
created incentive for them to voluntarily seek non-state sources of capital.  Supply shortages, 
uncertainty about levels of state funding, the need to bargain for favorable treatment, and the 
disincentives associated with having profits be redirected to nonprofitable firms increased the appeal 
of external funding, particularly for firms that were performing relatively well financially and in 
economies where the transition process was smooth and more advanced.   
Currently, firms have a variety of external finance alternatives available and their evaluations 
of these options are influenced by both an increasing desire for autonomy and the institutional context 
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of transition.  Financing firm activities with retained earnings is one important option many managers 
consider first.  Retained earnings are calculated as net profits accumulated in a business, as they are in 
the Western practice.  Loans from domestic banks are increasingly available.  When banks are still 
state-owned, bank loans involve relatively little risk, especially if state agencies are still more 
forgiving than other lenders.  Loans and investments from other domestic firms, public debt, and 
borrowing from private or foreign entities are all relatively riskier than state bank loans for both the 
lenders and the borrowers.  Lenders have limited information available for evaluating potential 
borrowers because borrowing histories are short and financial data are unavailable.  Yet because of the 
autonomy advantages or simply increasing financing needs of borrowers and the potential financial 
gains for lenders these forms of exchanging capital become increasingly common.  
Several factors, however, still complicate the capital structure decision and management in 
transition economies compared to more developed market environment.  There is a perception of 
greater uncertainty in the taxes and tax rates that may prevail.  Existing or potential impediments to 
cross boundary flows of capital may inhibit the availability and affect the cost of capital.  The 
perceived risk of realization of the actual benefits of projects is high as well as the risk that projects 
may not attain expected cash flows.  The volatility in equity markets also affects perceptions of the 
risks concerning availability of capital.  Higher political risks influence perceptions (and often reality) 
of restrictive acts by governments that diminish the net cash benefits to the company or investors.   
All these factors result in: (i) relatively high costs of capital; and (ii) absence of markets for 
long-term capital.  The adverse effect on the cost and availability of capital is the transparent effect.  
Other effects exist that have a feedback on the development of the economy and the availability and 
cost of capital.  The absence of markets for long-term capital results in: (i) mismatch of asset life with 
financing life; (ii) desire for projects that generate cash flow earlier in time; (iii) truncation of the 
investment set of companies.6  
 
Evidence  
In this section, with the means of a descriptive empirical analysis of the evolution of capital structure 
(measured as D/(D+E) ratio) in eight transition economies, we reconcile the theory outlined with the 
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specificities of the transition process described above.7  On this basis we derive later some practical 
guidelines that might be useful to firm managers in their financing decisions.  We use manufacturing 
company account data for several years of transition (during the period 1992-1999) that are 
accumulated in the AMADEUS data set.8  The mean and median yearly values of the D/(D+E) ratio 
for each country are reported in table 1.  In table 2, the use of debt by companies with different cash 
flow positions is illustrated.  Our approach is to compare the evolution of capital structure between 
countries and throughout time taking under consideration the specificities of the transition in each 
country.9   
The empirical evidence derived in this simple way is useful and shows a good approximation 
of the reality achieved by our stylized theoretical model.  Companies in less risky and volatile 
environment can operate closer to the optimal debt ratio.  The range of the flat portion of the WCOC 
curve over which they operate is sensitive to several factors such as: (i) the need to have unused good 
debt capacity during downturns in the economy to take advantage of opportunities; (ii) the relationship 
between issuing debt and equity and the costs of issuing new financial securities; (iii) particular needs 
which may exist during transition and downturns in the economy.10   
- Table 1 here - 
Thus, during the early years of transition when the economic conditions were very risky, debt 
equity ratios in all countries were lower compared with the current levels and the average for the 
whole period.  Exception is Bulgaria, where during the first years of transition soft budget constraint 
and low financial discipline were widely spread and companies were excessively levered.  In contrast, 
in Poland and Slovakia, for example, where the reforms started earlier and were more strictly 
enforced, capital structure was characterized by much lower proportion of debt.  Debt levels of 
Romanian firms were low due to the explicit government policy of debt repayment by all means, 
which, however, negatively affected investment.   
With the advancement of the transition general trend is the increase in the D/(D+E) ratios and 
convergence towards industry optimal levels.  Exception is again Bulgaria and also Romania, where in 
the last years following a severe financial crisis very strict lending restrictions are imposed on the 
financial institutions.  This clearly results in extreme credit access limitation and even “credit crunch”, 
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which together with the bankruptcy or debt restructuring of the big debtors, is reflected in the very low 
debt ratios in these countries for the last year or two.  However, in general for most of the Central and 
Eastern European countries there is clearly a convergence of debt ratios towards levels similar to the 
levels of Western companies.  
The pattern of adjustment of D/(D+E) ratios, generally supports the mechanism described in 
the conceptual model.  For most of the countries the highest levels of debt ratios are observed soon 
after relative stabilization in the economy is achieved.  Past this point in time, somewhat lower debt 
ratio levels follow.  This clearly is a result of the improved general lending conditions as well as of the 
individual firm behavior.  Firms in their searching and adjusting towards optimal debt levels have 
increased their borrowing, which often resulted in relatively too high leverage.  Discovering this fact 
in the following years firms have adjusted downwards (to the left on the WCOC curve) their D/(D+E) 
ratios.   
Companies in more risky and volatile environment normally manage its capital structure over 
a broader range of the WCOC curve.  Reviewing the standard deviations of the means of average 
D/(D+E) ratios, conforms the prediction that in more volatile and risky environment firms’ debt ratios 
fluctuate in broader range.  Thus the standard deviations for the countries characterized with most 
turmoil in their transition, Bulgaria and Romania, are highest both in absolute value and relative to the 
mean.  Besides general industry evolution factors, this observation reflects the fact that firms in these 
countries are forced to change more often their capital structure throughout time and that they differ 
more widely in their pattern of financing.   
Management of capital structure is sensitive to the cash flow patterns of the company during 
transition.  Some companies generate cash by reducing inventories or selling redundant assets.  Such 
companies may have the ability to operate in a narrower range of capital structure than companies 
lacking excess inventories and assets.  As the economy emerges and grows there is increasing demand 
for cash by companies to fund production and restore inventory levels.   
- Table 2 here - 
The fact that capital structure is sensitive to the cash flow patterns, is illustrated in table 2.  In 
most countries firms with negative cash flows borrow more and thus show up with higher D/(D+E) 
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ratios.  This pattern holds for more advanced transition economies where firms enjoy more unused 
(good) debt capacity.  Clearly, in Bulgaria and Romania firms with negative cash flows are at the limit 
of their debt capacity, which puts them under financial distress.  Such firms are denied access to 
capital and are forced to omit profitable investment opportunities.   
 
Guidelines 
Decisions that involve risk call for common sense.  One rule of risk management is to position the 
company so that it can choose to take an action rather than have circumstances compel it to take an 
action.  The use of debt does add risk to a company.  Therefore, it is important to position the 
company so that to be able at a later date to choose to borrow or pay off debt.  In the economies in 
transition, particularly in countries where the process is less advanced, the above rule is often not 
applied.  Therefore, companies are compelled by the circumstances to borrow or pay off debt.  This 
situation is often reinforced by the inherited effect soft budget constraints under communism and in 
the early years of transition.   
If a company generates cash in excess of its needs, it has free cash flow.  Free cash flow 
companies enjoy an enviable position of generating sufficient equity internally so that the company 
does not have to raise capital in markets.  Instead, the company can focus on finding attractive uses for 
its cash, use the cash to manage its capital structure, or return the cash to shareholders.  Free cash flow 
companies have an expanding economic equity base.  This expanding base changes the debt to capital 
ratio.  The company can repurchase equity and issue additional debt as necessary to pursue the desired 
capital structure.  Free-cash generating companies enjoy the luxury of choosing the timing of 
interaction with capital markets.   
A company having cash generation less than its equity capital needs must resort to raising 
equity and debt in the appropriate ratios to pursue its target capital structure.  Companies needing 
capital from external sources face the risk of changing capital market conditions.  Common sense 
suggests issuing equity and restoring a cushion of equity during times of market euphoria rather than 
having the lack of good debt capacity and financing needs compel the issuance of equity during 
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downturns in the market.  During good times the merit is of paying down principle on debt to restore 
“good” borrowing capacity.  
Capital structure is sensitive also to expected opportunities.  Good borrowing capacity during 
transition may allow the company to take advantage of opportunities that result from the failure of 
other companies to prudently manage their financial needs.  Unused good debt capacity permits 
borrowing quickly and on favorable terms.  Issuing equity normally is disadvantageous due to market 
conditions.  In addition, usually an equity issue takes a relatively long time or it is often impossible to 
obtain in the economies in transition. 
The strategy of a firm may influence the choice of capital structure.  For example, the nature 
of future capital investments may call for an adjustment in target capital structure.  Investments that 
will increase the business risk of the company will shift the optimal debt ratio to the left.  Since the 
company does not want to find itself to the right of the optimal ratio, management should adjust the 
target capital structure.  The company may anticipate acquisitions or divestitures.  Either may alter the 
business risk of the company, calling for an attendant adjustment in capital structure.  
 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Capital structure reflects the manner of financing a company.  Optimal capital structure results in 
lowering the cost of financial resources, improving net economic returns and increasing share value.  
The optimal capital structure is a function of several variables including the business risk of a 
company and the tax rate.  The tax deductibility of interest makes the use of the appropriate amount of 
debt beneficial to shareholders and share price.  The higher the tax rate, the greater the benefits of 
using a given amount of debt.  The lower (higher) the business risk of a company, the greater (less) the 
proportion of debt it should use in its capital structure.  Changes in business risk result in changes in 
the optimal capital structure.  For example, a reduction in business risk without a decrease in net 
operating income allows the company to use more “good debt” with attendant additions to value 
stemming from the tax benefits of incremental debt.  
Several factors prompt the adoption of a management strategy for capital structure of any 
modern corporation.  The presence of issuance costs, economies of scale in new financing, the need 
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for underpricing new issues of stock, taxes on dividends, regulations, variance in market conditions, 
and other factors make it impractical to raise incremental capital in the exact proportions of a target 
capital structure.  Clearly, optimal capital structure is a dynamic problem calling for continuous 
monitoring and adjustment.  Furthermore, these considerations are increasingly important for the 
economies in transition where, with the development of markets, the potential of value enhancing 
management of capital structure is high. 
In transition the economic environment is more volatile and risky than in developed markets.  
Therefore, a management scheme of capital structure that provides for flexibility in financing is 
preferable.  The weighted cost of capital curve is flat at debt to equity ratios less than the optimal 
capital structure.  Hence, the gain in flexibility has a small cost in terms of the weighted cost of capital 
and provides for more unused good debt capacity.  In fact, markets may value this flexibility in which 
case the optimal use of debt might even be less than the theoretical proportion.  In any case, a 
management strategy for capital structure in transition economies should focus on providing for 
capital needs of the firm while remaining in the flat portion of the weighted cost of capital curve.  
Proper selection and management of capital structure would offer the prospect of enhancing value for 
shareholders.  At the same time, the reduction in cost of capital to the company has potentially 
favorable influence on the economy and the standard of living.   
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FOOTNOTES 
1 Creditors normally expect a company to generate cash flow from operations to pay interest and repay principal.  
A company might sell assets to generate cash or engage in other financing to meet obligations.  A company can 
only sell an asset once to raise cash.  A company has a limit on alternative financing available. Hence, creditors 
expect companies to generate cash flow to service debt. 
2 Mistakes in financing may affect value by affecting the choice and timing of new investments. 
3 Here we avoid to advocate neither the “pecking order” nor the static-tradeoff models. 
4 Note the P/E ratio is the market price of a share divided by the earnings.  In this case we are using market price 
and economic net earnings. Since this is a ratio, the P/E indicates the price a person will pay for a unit of 
expected earnings given the perceived risk associated with that unit.  An increase in the risk of earnings is akin to 
lowering the quality of that unit and hence, its price and P/E ratio.  Logical investors pay less for a unit of 
earnings if the risk of a unit of earnings increases; hence, the decline in the P/E ratio.  
5 The higher the tax rate, the greater the value of the tax deductibility of the debt and the more important it is to 
use the appropriate capital structure.  This does not mean, however, that higher tax rates are more favorable.  In 
fact, a zero tax rate would be optimal for shareholders - but there no longer would be a reason to use debt in the 
financing of a firm. 
6 The shortage of long-term financing results in the selection of projects with short lives.  This short-life project 
phenomenon may adversely affect the long-term availability of cash flows. 
7 The countries considered are Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia. 
8 The AMADEUS data set, provided by the Bureau van Dijk, Belgium, consists of large and medium sized firms, 
which are characterized by an employment level exceeding 100 or with total assets and total sales exceeding $12 
million.  
9 We have calculated also the values of D/(D+E) ratio across various types of industry within the group of 
manufacturing firms.  However, because of the homogeneity of the sample in this respect, there were no 
significant variations observed in any one of the countries. 
10 For example, utilities often must meet commitments for new services regardless of economic conditions to 
comply with the requirements of the grant of monopoly. 
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Figure 1: Relationship between capital structure (D/(D+E)),  
cost of capital (WCOC) and firm value (POS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Myers (1984) 
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Table 1: Capital structure in Transition economies:  
Evolution of the D/(D+E) ratio in time* 
 
Year Bulgaria Croatia Czech Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia
1992 0.51/0.59 - - - 0.24/0.24 - - -
1993 0.40/0.32 - 0.29/0.29 - 0.29/0.37 - 0.24/0.25 -
1994 0.80/0.75 0.29/0.30 0.28/0.25 - 0.32/0.29 0.21/0.11 0.25/0.24 0.30/0.28
1995 0.73/0.63 0.28/0.25 0.28/0.25 0.33/0.33 0.32/0.30 0.20/0.14 0.32/0.30 0.32/0.30
1996 0.39/0.40 0.32/0.30 0.39/0.40 0.38/0.38 0.37/0.37 0.25/0.21 0.41/0.43 0.32/0.31
1997 0.27/0.25 0.33/0.32 0.40/0.41 0.39/0.39 0.38/0.38 0.26/0.21 0.40/0.41 0.32/0.32
1998 0.08/0.03 0.33/0.31 0.37/0.36 0.41/0.43 0.34/0.32 0.27/0.23 0.40/0.40 0.32/0.31
1999 0.08/0.05 0.31/0.29 0.38/0.35 0.33/0.31 0.27/0.25 0.09/0.04 0.40/0.42 -
Average 
(Sd.) 
0.26/0.16 
(0.30) 
0.32/0.31 
(0.15) 
0.35/0.35
(0.18)
0.38/0.38 
(0.18)
0.35/0.34 
(0.18)
0.22/0.16 
(0.20)
0.36/0.37 
(0.17) 
0.31/0.30 
(0.15)
* Notation: Mean/Median 
Source: AMADEUS dataset 
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Table 2: Capital structure in Transition economies:  
Variation of the D/(D+E) ratio with the level of cash flows* 
 
Cash flow Bulgaria Croatia Czech Hungary Poland Romani
a
Slovakia Slovenia
Negative 
(% firms) 
0.21/0.09 
(19.7) 
0.38/0.41 
(2.7) 
0.38/0.38 
(14.8)
0.42/0.42 
(7.2)
0.40/0.39 
(7.1)
0.24/0.19 
(14.8)
0.40/0.44 
(11.0) 
0.48/0.51 
(0.6)
Below 
average 
0.23/0.14 0.37/0.36 0.35/0.35 0.38/0.38 0.34/0.32 0.20/0.15 0.35/0.36 0.33/0.32
Above 
average 
0.37/0.31 0.31/0.30 0.34/0.33 0.37/0.37 0.34/0.33 0.26/0.20 0.37/0.37 0.31/0.30
* Notation: Mean/Median 
Source: AMADEUS dataset 
 
 
